In Re Emil P. Jurado | 243 SCRA 299 (1995)

Article 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.

In Re Emil P. Jurado | 243 SCRA 299 (1995)

FACTS:

Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general circulation (Manila Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in the judiciary over several months (from about October 1992 to March 1993). Other journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts.

What was particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled “Who will judge the Justices?” referring to a report that six justices, their spouses and children and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong, and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by a public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized by this public utility firm.

This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme Court decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been authored by a lawyer of the public utility firm. The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-called “controversial case” of “Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI),” G.R. No, 94374. In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.

 The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also received from the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations made by Jurado are true.

 

ISSUE #1:

WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the published writings.

 

HELD:

NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection.

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: “ARTICLE 19. Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.” The provision is reflective of the universally accepted precept of “abuse of rights,” “one of the most dominant principles which must be deemed always implied in any system of law.”

Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials.
Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity, and competence than are commonly required from private persons. Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and reputation. For to so rule will be to discourage all save those who feel no need to maintain their self-respect from becoming judges.

The public interest involved in freedom of speech and the individual interest of judges (and for that matter, all other public officials) in the maintenance of private honor and reputation need to be accommodated one to the other. And the point of adjustment or accommodation between these two legitimate interests is precisely found in the norm, which requires those, who, invoking freedom of speech, publish statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or other public officials to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements they publish. The norm does not require that a journalist guarantee the truth of what he says or publishes. But the norm does prohibit the reckless disregard of private reputation by publishing or circulating defamatory statements without any bona fide effort to ascertain the truth thereof.

Note: In this case, Jurado failed to reliably confirmed that raw intelligence or reports he received surrounding the corruption in the Judiciary. Moreover, some of his reports were completely untrue because he did not bother to make any further verification.

 

ISSUE #2:

WON the court has the power to cite him for contempt.

 

HELD:

YES. The Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any manner with a case before the Court. The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own protection against improper interference with the due administration of justice." Contempt is punishable, even if committed without relation to a pending case.           

Jurado would also claim that the Court has no administrative supervision over him as a member of the press or over his work as a journalist, and asks why he is being singled out, and, by being required to submit to a separate administrative proceeding, treated differently than his other colleagues in media who were only asked to explain their reports and comments about wrongdoing in the judiciary to the Ad Hoc Committee.

The answer is that upon all that has so far been said, the Court may hold anyone to answer for utterances offensive to its dignity, honor or reputation which tend to put it in disrepute, obstruct the administration of justice, or interfere with the disposition of its business or the performance of its functions in an orderly manner. Jurado has not been singled out. What has happened is that there have been brought before the Court, formally and in due course, sworn statements branding his reports as lies and thus imposing upon him the alternatives of substantiating those reports or assuming responsibility for their publication.

Jurado would have the Court clarify in what capacity — whether a journalist, or as a member of the bar — he has been cited in these proceeding. Thereby he resurrects the issue he once raised in a similar earlier proceeding: that he is being called to account as a lawyer for his statements as a
journalist.

This is not the case at all. Upon the doctrines and principles already inquired into and cited, he is open to sanctions as journalist who has misused and abused press freedom to put the judiciary in clear and present to the danger of disrepute and of public obdium and opprobrium, detriment and prejudice of the administration of justice. That he is at the same time a member of the bar has nothing to do with the setting in of those sanctions, although it may aggravate liability.

Jurado’s actuations, in the context in which they were done, demonstrate gross irresponsibility, and indifference to factual accuracy and the injury that he might cause to the name and reputation of those of whom he wrote.

They constitute contempt of court, directly tending as they do to degrade or abase the administration of justice and the judges engaged in that function. By doing them, he has placed himself beyond the circle of reputable, decent and responsible journalists who live by their Code or the “Golden Rule” and who strive at all times to maintain the prestige and nobility of their calling.