People vs Almonte G.R. No. 35006 September 7, 1931 (stabbing, internal hemorrhage)

Purificacion Almonte is charged with the crime of homicide. The accused pleaded not guilty, and after the trial, at which she was represented by counsel, she was convicted of the said crime of homicide, and sentenced to fourteen years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of P1,000, and to pay the costs. The defendant appealed.

Until a week before the crime, the accused lived maritally with the Chinaman Felix Te Sue who was a married man. Because one Miguela Dawal, with whom he had also lived maritally, threatened to bring suit against him unless he rejoined her, the Chinaman and the accused voluntarily agreed to separate. From that time on Te Sue lived in the barrio of Guinlajon, municipality of Sorsogon, Province of Sorsogon, together with the said Miguela Dawal. On the morning of October 1, 1930, the accused visited her former paramour and on entering the house, found him with Miguela. When Te Sue saw her, he approached and told her to go away at once because her new paramour might get jealous and do her harm. The accused insisted upon remaining, and on being pushed by Te Sue and Miguela, feeling that she was being unjustly treated, took hold of a small penknife she carried and stabbed the man in the abdomen. Horrified, perhaps, at her deed, she fled to the street, leaving the blade sticking in her victim's abdomen, and, taking the first bus that chanced to pass, finally went home. The injured man was at once taken to the provincial hospital where he was given first aid treatment, and Doctor Ortega performed a slight operation upon him, cleaning and sewing up his wound. It was not serious, according to the doctor, and might be healed in a week; but on the sixth day the patient succumbed to complications which we shall treat of later on. The relatives of the deceased paid a little over P200 for the hospital treatment and the expenses of his last illness.

In this instance the defense assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the trial court in its judgment:

I. The trial court erred in holding that the unnecessary movements of the deceased while in the provincial hospital of Sorsogon for medical treatment were caused by the pain of the wound inflicted by the accused.

II. The trial court erred in holding the accused criminally responsible for the secondary hemorrhage which caused the death of the deceased.

III. The trial court erred in holding the accused responsible for the death of the offended party as the direct and immediate consequence of the wound inflicted by the accused.

IV. The trial court erred in holding the accused of the crime of homicide as charged in the information instead of lesiones leves as supported by the evidence in this case.

We have shown that in the case at bar the real and actual cause of death of the deceased was the hemorrhage of the internal veins, which had already been congested by the wound produced and the patient's nervous condition, rather than the so-called bodily movements, and that these, if they were the immediate cause of his death, were the direct consequence of the patient's pathological condition or nervousness. At any rate, they are both traceable to the wound inflicted by the accused.

The last assignment of error is but a corollary to the first three, which have just been refuted, and it is contended that the accused can only be convicted of slight physical injuries, instead of the serious crime of homicide. If the appellant must answer for all the consequences of her acts voluntarily performed, as we have shown, it necessarily and logically follows that she must be convicted of the graver offense.

The appellant is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of not having intended to commit so serious a crime as that committed, and of having acted with passion and obfuscation. The first is shown by the fact that she made use of a small penknife, and the second, by the fact that before the attack she had been pushed out of the room where the victim was, and that she considered such treatment as an offense or abuse. The penalty must therefore be reduced one degree or to prision mayor.

Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is modified and the appellant is sentenced to eight years and one day of prision mayor, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P500, to suffer the accessory penalties of article 61 of the Penal Code, and to pay the costs of both instances. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, and Villamor, JJ., concur.