CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997

 

CECILLEVILLE REALTY AND SERVICE CORPORATION v. COURT OF APPEALS AND HERMINIGILDO PASCUAL G.R. No. 120363, September 5, 1997

FRANCISCO, J. The Supreme Court applied the law, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, according to its plain and obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. This Court should not deviate therefrom.

FACTS: In 1976, Sotero Pascual became a tenant of Jose A. Resurreccion, the President of petitioner Cecileville Realty and Service Corporation, in the latter's land at Catmon, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. When Sotero died, his wife Ana Pascual, succeeded him in tenancy by operation of law. As such tenant she had a home lot and a house on the landholding. She was assisted in the cultivation of the land by her son, private respondent Hermigildo Pascual, who also occupies a portion of the landholding distinct from that occupied by his mother. Petitioner Cecileville sought to eject Hermigildo from the portion occupied by his house but the latter, insisting that he is entitled to occupancy since he is helping his mother in the cultivation of the land, refused to vacate. Petitioner instituted an ejectment suit against Hermigildo before MTC of Sta. Maria, Bulacan. Finding no tenancy relationship between petitioner and Hermigildo, the MTC ordered the latter to vacate the land and pay attorney's fees and the sum of P500.00 monthly from the filing of the complaint. On appeal, however, the RTC reversed the MTC and ordered that the case be remanded to the DARAB for further adjudication. The court was of the opinion that Ana Pascual was entitled to the help of her son in the cultivation, consequently, her son cannot be simply ejected without circumventing the law. The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the RTC's decision on the basis of Section 5, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, governing the relations of landlords and tenants, which provides that a tenant is entitled to the aid and assistance of the immediate members of his family and other persons who, though not tenants themselves, are afforded the protection of the law and the security of tenure accorded the tenant. Thus, the Court of Appeals concluded that Hermigildo's having a house on the landholding is but an incident of the tenancy. In this petition for review on certiorari Cecileville contends that the appellate court erred in not finding that while private respondent is entitled to work on the agricultural land of petitioner in his capacity as member of the family of tenant Ana Pascual, nonetheless he cannot occupy a substantial portion thereof and utilize the same for residential purposes.

HELD: As clearly provided by Section 22, paragraph 3, RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263, only a tenant is granted the right to a home lot and the right to construct and maintain a house thereon. Private respondent is not entitled to a home lot. As the Court sees it, the issue lies on the interpretation of Sec. 22, paragraph 3, of RA No. 1199, as amended by RA No. 2263. This section provides in full as follows:

 "Section 22.x x x (3) The tenant shall have the right to demand for a home lot suitable for dwelling with an area of not more than 3 per cent, of the area of his landholding provided that it does not exceed one thousand square meters and that it shall be located at a convenient and suitable place within the land of the landholder to be designated by the latter where the tenant shall construct his dwelling and may raise vegetables, poultry, pigs and other animals and engage in minor industries, the products of which shall accrue to the tenant exclusively. The tenant's dwelling shall not be removed from the lot already assigned to him by the landholder, except as provided in Section 26 unless there is a severance of the tenancy relationship between them as provided under Section 9, or unless the tenant is ejected for cause, and only after the expiration of forty-five (45) days following such severance of relationship or dismissal for cause."

The law is unambiguous and clear. Consequently, it must be applied according to its plain aNd obvious meaning, according to its express terms. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the word, only a tenant is granted the right to have a home lot and the right to construct or maintain a house thereon. And here, private respondent does not dispute that he is a mere member of Ana Pascual's immediate farm household. Under the law, therefore, we find private respondent not entitled to a home lot. Neither is he entitled to construct a house of his own or to continue maintaining the same within the very small landholding of petitioner. To rule otherwise is to make a mockery of the purpose of the tenancy relations between a bona fide tenant and the landholder as envisioned by the very law, i.e., RA No. 1199, as amended, upon which private respondent relies, to wit:

Section 2. Purpose. - It is the purpose of this Act to establish agricultural tenancy relations between landholders and tenants upon the principles of social justice; to afford adequate protection to the rights of both tenants and landholders: to issue the equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land; to provide tenant-farmers with incentives to greater and more efficient agricultural production, to bolster their economic position and to encourage their participation in the development of peaceful, vigorous and democratic rural communities. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, if the Court were to follow private respondent's argument and allow all the members of the tenant's immediate farm household to construct and maintain their houses and to be entitled to not more than one thousand (1,000) square meters each of home lot, as what private respondent wanted th[e] Court to dole-out, then farms will be virtually converted into rows, if not colonies, of houses. How then can there be "equitable division of the produce and income derived from the land" and "more efficient agricultural production" if the land's productivity and use for growing crops is lessened or, more appropriately, obliterated by its unceremonious conversion into residential use? It is a fundamental principle that once the policy or purpose of the law has been ascertained, effect should be given to it by the judiciary. The Court should not deviate therefrom. The landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law. The policy of social justice is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged.

Further, it is undisputed that Ana Pascual, the tenant and private respondent's mother, has an existing home lot and a house on the subject property in which private respondent may take refuge while attending to his work. Curiously, despite its availability, private respondent chose to construct, without petitioner's permission, a concrete house of his own thereby saving him the trouble of paying appropriate rents. If the courts were to abide by the respondent court's inordinate pronouncement that private respondent is entitled to maintain his own house then we will be condoning the deprivation of a landholder's property without even a fraction of compensation. It taxes the credulity of the Court, therefore, to insist that private respondent's having a house of his own on the property is merely incidental to the "tenancy" and to afford him the convenience of attending to the cultivation of the land for, in the first place, he is not the tenant as he himself admits. Besides, the "incidental" use of his own house can very well be provided by the existing house of his mother, who with her "old and infirm" condition, surely needs the attention and care of her children, one of whom is herein private respondent. Be it emphasized that like the tenant the landholder is also entitled to the protection of the law, as one of the purposes of the "Act" is "to afford adequate protection to the rights of BOTH tenants and landholders." The policy of social justice, the Court reiterates, is not intended to countenance wrongdoing simply because it is committed by the underprivileged. "Compassion for the poor," as [the Court] said in Galay, et al. v. CA,, et al., is an imperative of every humane society but only when the recipient is not a rascal claiming an undeserved privilege."