Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile G.R. No. L-61388 April 20, 1983

 

CASE Number: G.R. No. L-61388 | 1983-04-20

CASE Name: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR., JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner, vs. MINISTER JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL CORONEL, respondents. Ponente: DE CASTRO, J.:

 

FACTS

Nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong who were having a conference. 4 other detainees were arrested the next day the (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya until their transfer to an undisclosed places. Petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot and academic, the whereabouts of petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina GarciaPadilla.

Petitioner: “arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since it was effected without any warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a search warrant”  nowhere in said warrant was authority given to make arrests, much less detention; that the search warrant which authorized respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of assorted calibers, medicine and other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra. Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore, illegal per se because it does not state specifically the things that are to be seized.

No criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the detainees; there is no judgment, decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate the continued detention of the petitioner; that while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but counsel and the detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its contents, raising a doubt whether such commitment order has in fact been issued. respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel, averring that the detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention.

ISSUES

1. Whether or not petitioners' detention is legal .

2. Whether or not the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal basis of the detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045 covered offenses.

 

 HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

(1)   Yes · Prior thereto to the arrest, the detainees were identified as members of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CCP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra. Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters. · Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different directions leaving on top of their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals, pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK). · Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed
and ready for distribution, and sizeable quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized. There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under Section 6(a), Rules 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when the person to be arrested has committed or actually committing, or is about to commit an offense in his presence. The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against goarrest and detention of persons ordered by the President through the issuance of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) is merely preventive government forces, or any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement.

(2) No. Political Question · reverting to the ruling of Montenegro vs. Castaneda that the President's decision to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other persons." · under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the exclusive prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under the doctrine of "political question," as has been applied in the Baker and Castaneda cases, on any ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus
diluting, if not abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang case. The supreme mandate received by the President from the people and his oath to do justice to every man should be sufficient guarantee, without need of judicial overseeing, against commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in the discharge particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the protection of public safety which in itself includes the protection of life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with the attribute of infallibility that when it reviews the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive power, for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault. From uber: The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with the suspension of the right to bail, if the government campaign to the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection. RULING: WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Note from uber: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended

 

FACTS  

motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner Garcia Padilla. The stress is on the continuing validity of Garcia v. Lansang as well as the existence of the right to bail even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

The motion asserted further that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not vest the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders, and that even it be assumed that he has such a power, the Supreme Court may review its issuance when challenged. It was finally alleged that since petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto, their arrest was illegal and void.

ISSUES

1.      whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vests the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders

 HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi)

PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to PD No. 1877. A PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the aforementioned crimes, for a period not exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to review by the President or by the Review Committee created for that purpose.

The crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses. Presidential Decree No. 1877 limits the duration of the preventive detention action for the period not exceeding one year. The persons who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July 12, 1982, and in whose behalf the above captioned cases was filed have been released detention by the military authorities concerned ·

There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential commitment order issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force or effect.

RULING: WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for reconsideration should have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the foregoing manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese, Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari, Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenido Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the petition as to them has been declared moot and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was issued by the municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for illegal possession of firearm and ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and academic.

 

 

 

 

Josefina Garcia-Padilla vs Minister of Defense Juan Ponce Enrile et al

G.R. No. L-61388 – 121 SCRA 472 – Political Law – Constitutional Law – Bill of Rights – Warrantless Arrest – Writ of Habeas Corpus – Reversal of the Lansang Doctrine; Reinstatement of the Montenegro Doctrine

In July 1982, Sabino Padilla, together w/ 8 others who were having a conference in a house in Bayombong, NV, were arrested by members of the Philippine Constabulary. The raid of the house was authorized by a search warrant issued by Judge Sayo. Josefina, mother of Sabino, opposed the arrest averring that no warrant of arrest was issued hence the arrest of her son and the others was w/o just cause. Sabino and companions together with 4 others were later transferred to a facility only the PCs know. Josefina petitioned the court for the issuance of the writ of habeas corpus.

ISSUE: Whether or not the arrests done against Sabino et al were valid.

HELD: Yes. In a complete about face, the SC decision in the Lansang Case was reversed and the ruling in the Barcelon Case & the Montenegro Case was again reinstated. The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus  was once again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government’s campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.

NOTE: This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that “the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended.”