JUAN VERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. G.R. No. L-31218 February 18, 1970

CA Decision February 13, 1969 - GUILTY affirming CFI decision

CFI Decision signed July 25, 1966; decision promulgated and read to the accused August 23, 1966

Judge retired July 31, 1966

Cannot question the jurisdiction of the court; it even appealed he decision to CA. 

JUAN VERA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHIL. G.R. No. L-31218 February 18, 1970

1. REMEDIAL LAW; COURTS; EXCEPTION TO GENERAL RULE ON NULLITY OF JUDGMENT IF JUDGE RETIRED PRIOR TO PROMULGATION OF SENTENCE. — Petitioners and intervenors can not now raise the issue that the sentence rendred by Judge Surtida is null and void on the ground that he already retired previous to the promulgation of the sentence. For appeals were taken thereon by herein petitioners and intervenor to respondent Court of appeals without ever questioning the decision or jurisidicction of said Judge in the case. As already established in this jurisdiction, after a certain stage, a jurisdictional question, even if on its face meritorious, would not necessarily be accorded the decisiveness that it might ordinarily possess if it would result in a failure of justice. The Court did not sanction petitioners’ and intervenor’s proposition, as it would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case and thus result in a failure of justice.

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; DUE PROCESS; COURT OF COMPETENT URISIDICTION CAN NOT BE QUESTIONED ON GROUND OF INJUSTICE AS DUE PROCESS WAS OBSERVED. — A due process question would have arisen if the decision arrived at the endds of justice were not served. Such is not the case, however. It is an admitted fact in this case that respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur, presided by then Judge Jose T. Surtida, was vested with jurisdiction to try and decide the case against petitioners. As admitted in the petition, the decision reached by him, thereafter affirmed with modification by respondent Court of Appeals, was "duly rendered and signed" on July 25, 1966 at a time before his retirement; though it was not until after his retirement on August 23, 1966 that said sentence was read to petitioners. had it been promulgated then and there, this particular question raised in this petition would not have risen.

3. ID.; ID.; DUE PROCESS MEANT TO EMBODY CANON OF FAIRNESS AND AVOIDANCE OF ARBITRARINESS. — What gave petitioners’ cause plausibility, was that it was not until after his retirement on August 23, 1966 that such a sentence was read to petitioners. Considering all the circumstances detailed above and the Tijam doctrine on which reliance could be had, it cannot be said that injustice was thereby committed against petitioners. They were given all the opportunity to defend themselves not only before the respondent Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur but likewise before respondent Court of Appeals. Petitioners cannot rightfully complain of having been the victims of arbitrary governmental action. They tried to have this Court, in an earlier petition for certiorari, to review the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals, but they did not meet with success because of their inability to demonstrate that they failed to receive the protection that due process accords every accused. What was said by Justice Cardozo fits the occasion: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true."