LUCIO MORIGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G R No 145226, February 6, 2004

 

Liberal construction of penal statutes in favor of the accused

LUCIO MORIGO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G R No 145226, February 6, 2004

Liberal construction of penal statutes in favor of the accused

FACTS: Lucia Barrete and Lucio Morigo were married on August 30, 1990 in Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol. A week later, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind. Barely a year thereafter, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a petition for divorce against appellant, which was granted by the court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago in Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed in the RTC Bohol a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of accused's marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony actually took place.

On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an Information filed with the RTC Bohol. After trial, appellant was convicted of bigamy, which conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence, the petition.

ISSUE: WON Lucio Morigo is guilty of bigamy.

HELD:

In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis, we laid down the elements of bigamy, thus:

1. the offender has been legally married;

2. the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively dead;

3. he contracts a subsequent marriage; and

4. the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.

Applying the forgoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract. SO ORDERED.

 

1. The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of solemnizing officer. The trial court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 3 and 4 of the Family Code. xxx The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6620, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.

2. The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.

3. The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan. In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that: A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."

4. It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.

5. In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, need no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage. The last issue involves the subject of statutory construction. In this connection, the Supreme Court ruled as follows: "The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statue in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed bigamy.

Further, we also find that we need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is now moot and academic." Hence, the assailed decision is SET ASIDE and the appellant is ACQUITTED of the offense of bigamy.