PARAS v COMELEC G.R. No. 123169

 

 

PARAS v COMELEC

G.R. No. 123169

Facts:

Petitioner is an elected barangay chairman of Pula, Cabanatuan City in 1994. Sometime in October 1995, a petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by his constituents. Public respondent COMELEC resolved to approve the petition and set the recall election on November 13. In view of the petitioner’s opposition, COMELEC deferred the election and rescheduled it on December 16, 1995. To prevent the recall election from taking place, the petitioner filed a petition for injunction before the RTC. The trial court issued a TRO. After conducting a summary hearing, the court dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order. The public respondent on a resolution date January 5, 1996, rescheduled the recall election to be held January 13, 1996. Hence, this petition for certiorari. The petitioner argues the pursuant to Section 74b of the Local Government code: “no recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 1996.

 

Issue:

Whether or not the recall election in question is in violation to the provisions of Section 74b of the Local Government Code.

 

Held:

The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for having become moot and academic, as the next regular elections are 7 months away. The TRO issued on 12 January 1996, enjoining the recall election, was made permanent.

Every part of statute must be interpreted with reference to the context of the whole enactment

It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. In the case at bar, Paragraph (b) of Section 74 construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, i.e. during the second year of his term of office. SK elections cannot be considered a regular election as this would render inutile the recall provision of the LGC.

Assumption that Legislature intended to enact an effective law

In the interpretation of a statute, the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.

Statute interpreted in harmony with the Constitution

It is a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. In the case at bar, the interpretation of Section 74 of the LGC, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum.

Intent of law paramount; too literal interpretation discouraged

The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit and intent. The too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which the Court cannot countenance. A too-literal reading of the law constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in ‘the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth’.

Intent of the law in prohibiting recall elections for one year immediately preceding a regular election

Recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official’s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.