QUETO vs. HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO G.R. Nos. L-25204 and L-25219 January 23, 1970

As a general rule a court proceeding in our judicial set-up is accusatorial or adversary and not inquisitorial in nature. It contemplates two contending parties before the court, which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial.

G.R. Nos. L-25204 and L-25219 January 23, 1970

QUETO alias TAN QUETO, (PERSHING TAN QUETO), ET AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. ALFREDO CATOLICO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, respondent. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor.

FACTS:

Two administrative complaints and four charges of “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” were formulated against Judge Alfredo Catolico.

The first complaint is that of the naturalization of 50 naturalized citizens which the  respondent Judge declared as null and void.

The second and third complaints which relate to respondent’s dismissal of the cases which have not been tried for more than thirty days and refusal to recognize not only the authority of the Court to authorize the continuation of the corresponding proceedings but also the personality of the Clerk of this Court to transmit to him the pertinent resolutions of the Court.

The fourth complaint is regarding the respondents alleged bias and prejudice either in his questioning of the witnesses or in acquitting the accused.

Respondent claims that all his impugned actuations were motivated by his desire to comply with the rules and the law and, most of all, the best interests of justice which require the speedy and expeditious disposition of cases. Respondents plead that “if at all there was any error committed it is of the mind rather than the heart”

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent acted with “serious misconduct and gross disregard of law” in the four complaints charged against him.

RULING:

For the obvious reason that all the facts involved in the first three complaints relate to matters of record in the proceedings in this Court in which respondent had been duly heard, no further administrative proceedings were held after respondent filed his answer.

In the first charge, the Court has, in a way, admonished the respondent, adding that they “should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure”

With reference to the second and third charges of the Secretary, the Court had already reprimanded respondent for his offense for his refusal to “apply the law” as interpreted by the tribunal.

Anent the fourth charge, the report of the investigator is to the effect that the actuations of respondent complained of by Mrs. Olaes were not due to any improper or personal motive and were just the result of the innocuous eccentricities and odd ways and ideas of respondent which could not be categorized as serious misconduct nor deserving of any heavier sanction than admonition.

While the Court was awaiting said report, however, in a letter dated April 17, 1975, respondent informed the Court that His Excellency, President Ferdinand E. Marcos had accepted his resignation effective January 11, 1974, “without prejudice to his receiving whatever rights he may be entitled to under the retirement and other existing laws.” Premises considered, and in line with the established policy regarding similar situations wherein the President has accepted resignations without prejudice to the grant of legally possible retirement benefits thus rendering administrative cases pending against the official concerned, moot and academic, the Court resolved to DISMISS the cases against respondent.

The issue is whether or not respondent Judge, motu proprio, had jurisdiction to reopen and review, or putting it more accurately in this case, to declare null and void the grant of citizenship to the petitioners pursuant to final judgments of competent courts and after the oaths of allegiance had been taken and the corresponding certificates of naturalization issued. It may be true, as alleged by said respondent, that the proceedings for naturalization were tainted with certain infirmities, fatal or otherwise, but that is beside the point in this case. The jurisdiction of the court to inquire into and rule upon such infirmities must be properly invoked in accordance with the procedure laid down by law. Such procedure is by cancellation of the naturalization certificate [Sec. 1(5), Commonwealth Act No. 63], in the manner fixed in Section 18 of Commonwealth Act No. 473, hereinbefore quoted, namely, "upon motion made in the proper proceedings by the Solicitor General or his representatives, or by the proper provincial fiscal." In other words, the initiative must come from these officers, presumably after previous investigation in each particular case.

As a general rule a court proceeding in our judicial set-up is accusatorial or adversary and not inquisitorial in nature. It contemplates two contending parties before the court, which hears them impartially and renders judgment only after trial. This basic philosophy would be violated if a judge were permitted to act as inquisitor, pursue his own independent investigation, arrive at a conclusion ex-parte, and then summon the party affected so as to enable him, if that were still possible, to show that the conclusion thus arrived at is without justification. The danger in all this is most forcefully demonstrated in the present case, where respondent Judge took "judicial notice," to use his own words, of "news" derogatory to one of the petitioners, thereby elevating rumors and gossip to the level of incontrovertible proof; and worse, where prejudgment, not to say prejudice, on the part of said respondent was so blatantly shown by the abusive epithets he used in referring to the same petitioner before he had any chance to be heard.

Judges, in their zeal to uphold the law, should not lose the proper judicial perspective, and should see to it that in the execution of their sworn duties they do not overstep the limitations of their power as laid down by statute and by the rules of procedure. If they arrogate unto themselves the authority allocated to other officials, there can be no consequence but confusion in the administration of justice and, in many instances, oppressive disregard of the basic requirements of due process.