TABAO v. JUDGE ESPINA A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348, 14 June 1996 EN BANC, PER CURIAM

 

TABAO v. JUDGE ESPINA A.M. No. RTJ-96-1348, 14 June 1996 EN BANC, PER CURIAM

The respondent Judge should be sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case.

FACTS: First Assistant City Prosecutor for Tacloban City, Leo C. Tabao, accused Judge Pedro S. Espina of: (a) Gross Irregularity, (b) Abuse of Authority, and (c) Bias in favor of the accused. In another sworn complaint, Regional State Prosecutor Francisco Q. Aurillo, Jr. manifested that he had earlier assailed before the CA an order issued by respondent granting bail to the accused without giving the prosecution a chance to present evidence to oppose the grant of bail. The Court of Appeals annulled respondent's orders, granting bail to the accused and denying the prosecution's motion for reconsideration of the order that granted bail. Respondent failed to comment on this aspect of the complaint against him. The records show that respondent Judge had set the promulgation of judgment in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197 entitled "People of the Phils. v. Salvador Padernal, "a case for violation of RA No. 6425 for drug pushing and had promulgated his decision thereon despite the defense's manifestation for time to allow it to submit other documentary evidence, make its formal offer of exhibits, and to rest its case. Judgment was promulgated and the prosecution was not given a chance to adduce rebuttal evidence. Respondent filed his comments on the separate complaints, arguing that he proceeded to decide the case without the documentary evidence of the defense because they were not submitted on time; that the evidence to be submitted, consisting of business licenses and permits, was immaterial to the innocence or guilt of the accused; that official duty is presumed to have been regularly performed unless the contrary is shown; that his grant of bail to the accused is now allowed in view of the ruling in People v. Simon (G.R. No. 93028, July 29, 1994, 234 SCRA 555).

HELD: The Office of the Court Administrator held that respondent's acts constituted an exercise of judicial prerogative. The Supreme Court ruled that respondent Judge should be sanctioned for digressing from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after both the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases; that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can determine whether or not to grant bail; and that the ruling in Simon did not alter, much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail and neither did it cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case.

The Supreme Court dismissed respondent from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch or instrumentality of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The Court has repeatedly stressed the ruling in People v. Dacudao (170 SCRA 489), that a hearing is absolutely indispensable before a judge can properly determine whether the prosecution's evidence is weak or strong on the issue of whether or not to grant bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime where the imposable penalty is death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Hence, a denial of the prosecution's request to adduce evidence, deprives it of procedural due process, a right to which it is entitled equally as the defense. A hearing is required to afford the judge a basis for determining the existence of those factors set forth under Rule 114, Section 6, Rules of Court in granting or rejecting a plea for bail. The hearing for bail though summary in nature is necessary to afford both the prosecution and the defense an opportunity to prove their respective contentions on the matter of bail for the accused. The Court has never hesitated to impose sanctions on judges who had granted bail to an accused charged with a heinous crime punishable with death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, without the required hearing.

In Santos v. Ofilada (245 SCRA 56), the Court expressing almost exasperation over repeated violations by judges in this regard stated that "it is indeed lamentable that despite the series of its pronouncements on the same administrative office, the Court still has to contend with the same problem all over again and to impose once more the same sanction. It is gross misconduct, even outright disrespect for the Court, for respondent judge to exhibit indifference to the resolution requiring him to comment on the accusations in the complaints thoroughly and substantially. Respondent cannot rely on the ruling in People v. Simon (234 SCRA 555), since the issue in the present complaints is his having granted bail to an accused charged with an offense then punishable with life imprisonment; without giving the prosecution the opportunity to show that evidence of guilt is strong and that as a consequence, the accused is not entitled to bail. Under the Rules of Court, a hearing for bail is mandatory to afford the State its right to oppose the granting of bail. The ruling in Simon did not alter much less set aside the State's right to a hearing to oppose bail. Neither did the ruling in Simon cure the defect of lack of a bail hearing in this case. On the issue regarding the manner of promulgating the decision in a criminal case, respondent judge digressed from the regular course and procedure of rendering judgment, which must be done only after the prosecution and the defense have rested their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense has rested their respective cases. In the subject criminal case, the defense had yet to rest its case when respondent rendered the judgment of acquittal. It is not difficult to imagine the grave injustice which would have resulted had respondent judge convicted the accused before the defense had rested its case. Of course, respondent judge acquitted the accused. But the questions now are: why the deliberate haste to acquit the accused, the same accused to whom bail had been granted by respondent judge without hearing the prosecution's evidence? And why was the prosecution denied the right to present rebuttal evidence when it manifested its intention to present rebuttal evidence when informed of the promulgation of judgment? Judges should be reminded that in each step in the trial of criminal cases, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of an accused requires that an accused be given sufficient opportunity to present his defense; so, with the prosecution as to its evidence. Hence, any deviation from the regular course of trial should always take into consideration the rights of all the parties to the case, whether in the prosecution or defense. In the exercise of their discretion, judges are sworn not only to uphold the law but also to do what is fair and just. The judicial gavel should not be yielded by one who has an unsound and distorted sense of justice and fairness. Respondent judge's conduct in the disposition of the criminal case subject of the present complaints leaves much to be desired. He miserably failed to exhibit the objectivity required of members of the bench that is necessary, even indispensable, to maintain the public's trust and confidence in the courts. In sum, respondent judge should be penalized for gross ignorance of the law in granting bail to the accused in Criminal Case No. 93-04-197, where the imposable penalty was life imprisonment, without hearing. He should also be accordingly sanctioned for having promulgated the decision in the same criminal case before the defense had rested and without according the prosecution an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.

NOTE: In the above-cited case, the Supreme Court made reference to and answered the respondent's contention and citation of the 1946 case of Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons (76 Phil. 756) to support his theory that where the prosecution recommends bail, it is to be understood as being equivalent to an admission that evidence of guilt is not strong or a non opposition or a virtual agreement to the bail application which in effect does away with the need for a bail hearing. Unfortunately, nowhere in said case may such conclusion be inferred. Besides, in Ocampo v. Bernabe (77 Phil. 55), the Court said: [The Court] ha[s] held in Herras Teehankee v. Director of Prisons that all persons shall before conviction be bailable except when the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. The general rule therefore is that all persons, whether charged or not yet charged are before their conviction entitled to provisional release on bail, the only exception being where the charge is a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is found to be strong. The determination of whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong is a matter of judicial discretion. This discretion by the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the court at the hearing. RESPONDENT. THUS, CANNOT PLEAD THAT THERE WAS ROOM FOR ANOTHER POSSIBLE INTERPRETATION AND THAT THEREFORE HIS ACT TO GRANTING BAIL WITHOUT HEARING IS BUT A CASE OF INNOCENT ERROR OR MISTAKE NOT TANTAMOUNT TO IGNORANCE OF THE LAW. ABD USUKUR M. TANv. COMMISSION ONELECTIONS. G.R. NO. 119892, FEBRUARY 13, 1996, EN BANC, MINUTE RESOLUTION. (Underscoring and Emphasis Supplied)