LEVERIZA et al vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA G.R. No. L-66614 January 25, 1988

 

Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable (Sto. Domingo v. De los Angeles, 96 SCRA 139),. that specific statute prevails over a general statute (De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760) and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail (Wil Wilhensen, Inc. v. Baluyot, 83 SCRA 38)

 

LEVERIZA et al  vs. IAC, Mobil oil and CAA

G.R. No. L-66614

January 25, 1988

 

FACTS: Around three contracts of lease resolve the basic issues in the instant case:

Contract A — a lease contract of April 2, 1965 between the Republic of the Philippines, represented by Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA)  and. Leveriza over a parcel of land containing an area of 4,502 square meters, for 25 years.

Contract B — a lease contract (in effect a sublease) of May 21, 1965 between Leveriza and Mobil Oil Philippines, Inc., over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters for 25 years; and

Contract C — a lease contract of June 1, 1968 between defendant CAA and plaintiff Mobil Oil over the same parcel of land, but reduced to 3,000 square meters, for 25 years.

There is no dispute among the parties that the subject matter of the three contracts of lease above mentioned, Contract A, Contract B, and Contract C, is the same parcel of land, with the noted difference that while in Contract A, the area leased is 4,502 square meters, in Contract B and Contract C, the area has been reduced to 3,000 square meters.

It is important to note, for a clear understanding of the issues involved, that it appears that defendant CAA  as LESSOR, leased the same parcel of land, for durations of time that overlapped to two lessees, to wit: (1) Leveriza and Mobil Oil, and the latter, as LESSEE, leased the same parcel of land from two lessors, to wit: (1) Leveriza and (2) CAA  for durations of time that also overlapped.

Leveriza, the lessee in Contract A and the lessor in Contract B, is now deceased. This is the reason why her successor-in-interest, her heirs, are sued. For purposes of brevity, these defendants shall be referred to hereinafter as Defendants Leveriza.

Mobil Oil  seeks the rescission or cancellation of Contract A and Contract B on the ground that Contract A from which Contract B is derived and depends has already been cancelled by the defendant CAA  and maintains that Contract C with the defendant CAA is the only valid and subsisting contract insofar as the parcel of land, subject to the present litigation is concerned.

Defendants Leverizas’ claim that Contract A which is their contract with CAA has never been legally cancelled and still valid and subsisting; that it is Contract C between plaintiff and defendant CAA which should be declared void.

CAA asserts that Contract A is still valid and subsisting because its cancellation by Jurado was ineffective and asks the court to annul Contract A because of the violation committed by Leveriza in leasing the parcel of land to plaintiff by virtue of Contract B without the consent of CAA. CAA further asserts that Contract C not having been approved by the Director of Public Works and Communications is not valid.

After trial, the lower courts rendered  judgment:

1.  Declaring Contract A as having been validly cancelled on June 28, 1966, and has therefore ceased to have any effect as of that date;

2. Declaring that Contract B has likewise ceased to have any effect as of June 28, 1966 because of the cancellation of Contract A;

3. Declaring that Contract C was validly entered into on June 1, 1968, and that it is still valid and subsisting;

CAA filed a Motion for Reconsideration, averring that because the lot lease was properly registered in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, it was only the President of the Philippines or an officer duly designated by him who could execute the lease contract pursuant to Sec. 567 of the Revised Administrative Code; that the Airport General Manager has no authority to cancel Contract A, the contract entered into between the CAA and Leveriza, and that Contract C between the CAA and Mobil was void for not having been approved by the Secretary of Public Works and Communications. Said motion was however denied.

On appeal, the IAC affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. Hence this petition for Review on certiorari.

ISSUE: There is no dispute that Contract  A  at the time of its execution was a valid contract. The issue therefore is whether or not  said contract is still subsisting after its cancellation by CAA on the ground of a sublease executed by petitioners with Mobil Oil (CONTRACT B) without the consent of CAA and the execution of another contract of lease between CAA and Mobil Oil (CONTRACT C)

The issue narrows down to: WON there is a valid ground for the cancellation of Contract A

HELD: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

YES

Contract A was entered into by CAA as the lessor and the Leverizas as the lessee specifically “for the purpose of operating and managing a gasoline station by the latter, to serve vehicles going in and out of the airport.”

As regards prior consent of the lessor to the transfer of rights to the leased premises, the provision of paragraph 7 & 8 of said Contract reads in full:

7. The Party of the Second part may transfer her rights to the leased premises but in such eventuality, the consent of the Party of the First Part shall first be secured. In any event, such transfer of rights shall have to respect the terms and conditions of this agreement.

8. Failure on the part of the Party of the Second Part to comply with the terms and conditions herein agreed upon shall be sufficient for revocation of this contract by the Party of the First Part without need of judicial demand.

It is not disputed that the Leverizas (lessees) entered into a contract of sublease (Contract B) with Mobil Oil without the consent of CAA (lessor). The cancellation of the contract was made in a letter by Jurado, Airport General Manager of CAA addressed to Rosario Leveriza.

Respondent Leverizas and the CAA assailed the validity of such cancellation, claiming that the Airport General Manager had no legal authority to make the cancellation. They maintain that it is only the (1)Secretary of Public Works and Communications, acting for the President, or by delegation of power, the (2)Director of CCA  who could validly cancel the contract. Petitioners argue that cancelling or setting aside a contract approved by the Secretary is, in effect, repealing an act of the Secretary which is beyond the authority of the Administrator.

Such argument is untenable. The terms and conditions under which such revocation or cancellation may be made, have already been specifically provided for in Contract “A” which has already been approved by the Department Head, It is evident that in the implementation of aforesaid contract, the approval of said Department Head is no longer necessary if not redundant

 

NOTES:

1. It is further contended that even granting that such cancellation was effective, a subsequent billing by the Accounting Department of the CAA has in effect waived or nullified the rescission of Contract “A.”

The billing of the petitioners by the Accounting Department of the CAA if indeed it transpired, after the cancellation of Contract “A” is obviously an error. However, this Court has already ruled that the mistakes of government personnel should not affect public interest.

 2. Petitioners further assail the interpretation of Contract “A”, claiming that Contract “B” was a mere sublease to Mobil Oil and requires no prior consent of CAA to perfect the same. Citing Article 1650 of the Civil Code, they assert that the prohibition to sublease must be expressed and cannot be merely implied or inferred.

As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, petitioners in asserting the non- necessity for a prior consent interprets the first sentence of paragraph 7 of Contract “A” to refer to an assignment of lease under Article 1649 of the Civil Code and not to a mere sublease. A careful scrutiny of said paragraph of Contract “A” clearly shows that it speaks of transfer of rights of Rosario Leveriza to the leased premises and not to assignment of the lease.

3. Petitioners likewise argued that it was contemplated by the parties to Contract “A” that Mobil Oil would be the owner of the gasoline station it would construct on the leased premises during the period of the lease, hence, it is understood that it must be given a right to use and occupy the lot in question in the form of a sub-lease.

In Contract “A”, it was categorically stated that it is the lessee (petitioner) who will manage and operate the gasoline station. The fact that Mobil Oil was mentioned in that contract was clearly not intended to give approval to a sublease between petitioners and said company but rather to insure that in the arrangements to be made between them, it must be understood that after the expiration of the lease contract, whatever improvements have been constructed in the leased premises shall be relinquished to CAA. Thus, this Court held that “the primary and elementary rule of construction of documents is that when the words or language thereof is clear and plain or readily understandable by any ordinary reader thereof, there is absolutely no room for interpretation or construction anymore.

 

4. <ADMINISTRATIVE LAW>Finally, petitioners contend that the administrator of CAA cannot execute without approval of the Department Secretary, a valid contract of lease over real property owned by the Republic of the Philippines, citing the Revised Administrative Code, which provide that Under 567 of the Revised Administrative Code, such contract of lease must be executed:

(1) by the President of the Philippines, or

(2) by an officer duly designated by him or

(3) by an officer expressly vested by law.

On the other hand, respondent CAA avers that the CAA Administrator has the authority to lease real property belonging to the RP under its administration even without the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, which authority is expressly vested in it by law, more particularly Section 32 (24) of Republic Act 776, which reads:

Sec. 32. Powers and Duties of the Administrator. — Subject to the general control and supervision of the Department Head, the Administrator shall have, among others, the following powers and duties:

xxx xxx xxx

(24) To administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and develop the Manila International Airport and all government aerodromes except those controlled or operated by the Armed Forces of the Philippines including such power and duties as: … (b) to enter into, make and execute contracts of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity; (c) to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property; right of ways, and easements which may be proper or necessary: Provided, that no real property thus acquired and any other real property of the Civil Aeronautics Administration shall be sold without the approval of the President of the Philippines. …

There is no dispute that the Revised Administrative Code is a general law while Republic Act 776 is a special law nor in the fact that the real property subject of the lease in Contract “C” is real property belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.

It is readily apparent that in the case at bar, the CAA has the authority to enter into Contracts of Lease for the government under the third category (Art. 567. )Thus, as correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the CAA has the power to execute the deed or contract involving leases of real properties belonging to the RP, not because it is an entity duly designated by the President but because the said authority to execute the same is, by law expressly vested in it, which in this case is RA 776.

Under the above-cited Section 32 (par. 24) of Republic Act 776, the Administrator (Director) of the CAA by reason of its creation and existence, administers properties belonging to the RP and it is on these properties that the Administrator must exercise his vast power and discharge his duty to enter into, make and execute contract of any kind with any person, firm, or public or private corporation or entity and to acquire, hold, purchase, or lease any personal or real property, right of ways and easements which may be proper or necessary. (The exception, however, is the sale of properties acquired by CAA or any other real properties of the same which must have the approval of the President of the Philippines.) The Court of appeals took cognizance of the striking absence of such proviso in the other transactions contemplated in paragraph (24) and is convinced as we are, that the Director of the CAA does not need the prior approval of the President or the Secretary of Public Works and Communications in the execution of Contract “C.”

In this regard, this Court, ruled that another basic principle of statutory construction mandates that general legislation must give way to special legislation on the same subject, and generally be so interpreted as to embrace only cases in which the special provisions are not applicable; that specific statute prevails over a general ;  and that where two statutes are of equal theoretical application to a particular case, the one designed therefor specially should prevail.