Coquilla vs COMELEC GR 88831 July 31, 2002

 

Coquilla vs COMELEC GR 88831 July 31, 2002

The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).”

 

FACTS:

Petitioner Coquilla was born on February 17, 1938 of Filipino parents in Oras, Eastern Samar. He grew up and resided there until 1965, when he joined the United States Navy. He was subsequently naturalized as a U.S. citizen. From 1970 to 1973, petitioner thrice visited the Philippines while on leave from the U.S. Navy. Otherwise, even after his retirement from the U.S. Navy in 1985, he remained in the United States.

 

On October 15, 1998, petitioner came to the Philippines and took out a residence certificate, although he continued making several trips to the United States, the last of which took place on July 6, 2000 and lasted until August 5, 2000. Subsequently, petitioner applied for repatriation under R.A. No. 81715 to the Special Committee on Naturalization. His application was approved on November 7, 2000, and, on November 10, 2000, he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines. Petitioner was issued Certificate of Repatriation No. 000737 on November 10, 2000 and Bureau of Immigration Identification Certificate No. 115123 on November 13, 2000.

 

On November 21, 2000, petitioner applied for registration as a voter of Butnga, Oras, Eastern Samar. His application was approved by the Election Registration Board on January 12, 2001. On February 27, 2001, he filed his certificate of candidacy stating therein that he had been a resident of Oras, Eastern Samar for “two (2) years.”

 

His opponent sought the cancellation of petitioner’s certificate of candidacy on the ground that the latter had made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by stating that he had been a resident of Oras for two years when in truth he had resided therein for only about six months since November 10, 2000, when he took his oath as a citizen of the Philippines.

 

ISSUE:

Whether or not Coquilla can be considered to have resided in Oras, Eastern Samar for more than one (1) year.

 

RULING:

No. The term “residence” is to be understood not in its common acceptation as referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” but rather to “domicile” or legal residence, that is, “the place where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home, where he, no matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain (animus manendi).”

 

Coquillo lost his domicile of origin in Oras by becoming a U.S. citizen after enlisting in the U.S. Navy in 1965. From then on and until November 10, 2000, when he reacquired Philippine citizenship, he was an alien without any right to reside in the Philippines save as our immigration laws may have allowed him to stay as a visitor or as a resident alien. Until his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship on November 10, 2000, petitioner did not reacquire his legal residence in this country.

 

[NOTE: This doctrine was NOT applied to Grace Poe’s case.]

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