Panaguiton v. DOJ (G.R. No. 167571, November 25, 2008)

 

G.R. No. 167571 November 25, 2008

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI, respondents.

 

Facts:

Cawili borrowed various sums of money from the petitioner. Cawili and his business associate, Tongson, jointly issued in favor of petitioner three checks which bear the signature of both in payment of the said loans. Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored. Petitioner, Panaguiton, made demands but to no avail and so he filed a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (B.P. 22) before the Quezon City Prosecutor’s Office.

During the preliminary investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit. Tongson alleged that he himself filed some complaints against Cawili and they are not associates. Panaguiton showed documents proving the signatures of Tongson to strengthen his complaint against Tongson. In a resolution, City Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili and dismissed the charges against Tongson.

A case was filed against Cawili before the proper court but the petitioner filed a partial appeal before the Department of Justice. The Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuño directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the National Bureau of Investigation.

Assistant City Prosecutor Sampaga dismissed the complaint against Tongson since the offense had already prescribed. An appeal by Panaguiton to the Department of Justice thru Undersecretary Manuel A.J. Teehankee was dismissed. But on motion for reconsideration, Undersecretary Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez declared that the offense had not prescribed. On motion for reconsideration, this time by Tongson, DOJ reversed and held that the offense had already prescribed.

Issue:

Whether or not the offense has prescribed as Act No. 3326 applies to violation of special acts and that Act No. 3326 states that prescription shall be interrupted when judicial proceedings are instituted.

Held:

SC agreed that Act. No. 3326 applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22 prescribes in four (4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof. Nevertheless, SC cannot uphold the position that only the filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

It must be pointed out that when Act No. 3326 was passed, preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was conducted by justices of the peace, thus, the phraseology in the law, “institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment,” and the prevailing rule at the time was that once a complaint is filed with the justice of the peace for preliminary investigation, the prescription of the offense is halted.

The court ruled and so hold that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner’s filing of his complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor signified the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of the information against petitioner.