Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC GR 119976, 248 SCRA 300 [Sept 18, 1995]

 

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC

GR 119976, 248 SCRA 300 [Sept 18, 1995]

 

QUALIFICATIONS of the Members of the House of Representatives Art. VI, Sec 6. For purposes of the Election law, “residence” is the same as “domicile”. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment of the old one.

 

Facts:

 

Petitioner Imelda Marcos, whose alleged legal residence is in Tacloban, Leyte, ran for Congress representing the 1st district of Leyte. Her adversary, Montejo, sought to disqualify her candidacy on the ground that, among others, she is not a resident of at least 1 year of Tacloban and therefore she did not satisfy the residency requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution as she in fact wrote in her Certificate of Candidacy that she resided “in the constituency where” she sought “to be elected” for only “seven months”. She later claimed it to be an honest mistake brought about by confusion and asserted that it is in fact her domicile “since childhood”. However, COMELEC resolved in favor of Montejo and contended that Imelda’s domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few decades except Tacloban. In its resolution, COMELEC cited San Juan, Metro Mla. and San Miguel, Mla. as places where she resided and served certain positions. Mention was even made of her residence in Malacañang and Honolulu, Hawaii.

 

Issue:

 

Is Tacloban, Leyte the legal residence of Imelda thereby satisfying the residence requirement mandated by Art VI, Sec 6 of the Constitution?

 

Held:

 

Yes. The honest mistake in the Certificate of Candidacy regarding the period of residency does not negate the fact of residence if such fact is established by means more convincing than a mere entry on a piece of paper. It is settled that when the Constitution speaks of “residence” in election law, it actually means only “domicile.” It was held that Tacloban, Leyte was in fact the domicile of origin of Imelda by operation of law for a minor follows the domicile of her parents (which was the same). In its Resolution, COMELEC was obviously referring to Imelda’s various places of actual residence, not her domicile (legal residence). An individual does not lose her domicile even if she has lived and maintained residences in different places. Successfully changing residence requires an actual and deliberate abandonment,* and Imelda has clearly always chosen to return to her domicile of origin. Even at the height of the Marcos Regime’s powers, she kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating important personal milestones there, instituting well-publicized projects for its benefit and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held positions of power always with either her influence or consent.

 

* To successfully effect a change in domicile, one must demonstrate: (1) actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (2) a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one; and (3) acts which correspond with the purpose (Marcos v. COMELEC, 248 SCRA 331)

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