Romualdez vs Marcelo G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 529 Phil. 90
Benjamin
(“KOKOY”) T. Romualdez vs. Hon. Simeon V. Marcelo and Presidential Commission
on Good Government, G.R. Nos. 165510-33, July 28, 2006, 529 Phil. 90
Facts:
Petitioner is being charged with violations of Section 7 of RA No. 3019 for
failure to file his Statements of Assets and Liabilities for the period
1967-1985 during his tenure as Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary and
for the period 1963-1966 during his tenure as Technical Assistant in the
Department of Foreign Affairs. However, the petitioner contended that his
criminal liability was extinguish by way of prescription. Respondents alleged
that the prescription was interrupted due to the absences of the petitioner for
being abroad.
Issue:
Whether the prescription period of an offense of a special law may be
interrupted by the absence of the accused for being outside the criminal
jurisdiction of our court through Suppletory application of Art 10. of the RPC.
Held:
No, if there is no gap in the law. Where the special law is silent, Article 10
of the RPC applies suppletorily,
ARTICLE 10. Offenses Not Subject to the Provisions of
this Code. — Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the
contrary.
Thus, the Court has applied
suppletorily various provisions of the RPC to resolve cases where the special
laws are silent on the matters in issue.
The silence of RA No. 3019 on
the question of whether or not the absence of the accused from the Philippines
prevents or tolls the running of the prescriptive period is more apparent than
real. Section 2 of Act No. 3326 provides that the prescription shall begin to
run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The running of the
prescriptive period shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted
against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are
dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Clearly, Section 2 of Act No.
3326 did not provide that the absence of the accused from the Philippines
prevents the running of the prescriptive period. Thus, the only inference that
can be gathered from the foregoing is that the legislature, in enacting Act No.
3326, did not consider the absence of the accused from the Philippines as a
hindrance to the running of the prescriptive period. Expressio unius est
exclusio alterius. the express mention of one person, thing, act,
or consequence, excludes the others.
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